Group Specific Public Goods, Orchestration of Interest Groups and Free Riding

Gil Epstein and Yosef Mealem
Additional contact information
Yosef Mealem: Netanya Academic College, Netanya, Israel

No 2009-02, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are decreasing as reflected in the contest success function. In the first part of the paper we show conditions under which freeriding decreases and consider the different properties of the equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we develop the properties of the optimal formation of the group and its affect on the equilibrium outcome.

Keywords: Contests; rent seeking; public good; heterogeneity; free-riding; orchestration of interest groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www2.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/2009-02/2009-02.pdf Working paper (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www2.biu.ac.il:443 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Department of Economics ().