Demystifying the 'Metric Approach to Social Compromise with the Unanimity Criterion'

Shmuel Nitzan

No 2009-18, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion.

Keywords: social choice; impossibility theorems; metric approach to compromise with the unanimity criterion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www2.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/2009-18.pdf Working paper (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Demystifying the ‘metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion’ (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Department of Economics ().