The Why, When and How of Immigration Amnesties
Gil Epstein and
Avi Weiss
No 2009-24, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper presents some of the many issues involved in the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. Complementing studies by Chau (2001, 2003), Karlson and Katz (2003) and Gang and Yun (2006), we consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties. We demonstrate the effects of government actions on allocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the interactions between these factors combine to yield an optimal amnesty policy. We also consider two extensions – intertemporal transfers of policing funds and “fuzziness” in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending and deporting undesirables.
Keywords: Amnesty; Immigration; Illegal Immigration; Border Controls; Internal Controls (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H59 J61 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Journal Article: The why, when, and how of immigration amnesties (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-24
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