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Judicial Independence and the Validity of Controverted Elections

Raphael Franck ()

No 2009-8, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This article examines whether the judges of the French Constitutional Court demonstrated partisanship when ruling on the validity of the elections to the lower house of the French Parliament between 1958 and 2005. It uses a new dataset on the decisions of the Constitutional Court which takes into account the characteristics of the controverted parliamentary elections. The rulings of the Constitutional Court are found to be biased against far-right candidates. However, the judges are also found to display some form of independence vis-à-vis the government since they do not favor candidates from the ruling party when they render their decisions.

Keywords: Judicial independence; Judicial politics; Judges; Parliamentary elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
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Journal Article: Judicial Independence and the Validity of Controverted Elections (2010) Downloads
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