Financial Sector Regulation and the Revolving Door in US Commercial Banks
Elise Brezis () and
Joël Cariolle ()
No 2016-03, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
The “revolving door” is a practice quite widely in use in the United States, in which heads of state agencies, after completing their bureaucratic terms, are entering the very sector they have regulated.This phenomenon is also frequent in France, where it is coined “pantouflage”, and in Japan, coined “amakudari” (descent from heaven). Research conducted and data collected by the research group Corporate Europe Observatory strongly suggest that this process is also significant within EU institutions.
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Working Paper: Financial Sector Regulation and the Revolving Door in US Commercial banks (2016)
Working Paper: Financial Sector Regulation and the Revolving Door in US Commercial banks (2015)
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