Should We Wish the Elite to Engage in Unethical Behavior? A Consequentialist Theory
Elise S Brezis ()
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Elise S Brezis: Bar-Ilan University
No 2024-01, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper investigates whether elite interconnections contribute to unethical behavior. It aims to present a clear explanation of how these connections are established, analyze the presence of unethical conduct within them, and assess their impact on the economy and societal welfare. This paper centers on a specific aspect of elite interconnection – the revolving door. It shows that the entire power elite is responsible for orchestrating this procedure and, consequently, for engaging in unethical behavior. Interconnection is a direct outcome of the collective decision of all elites to endorse the revolving door. However, prohibiting it would be detrimental to everyone, including the general public. This paper shows that the public and the political elite should accept the existence of unethical behavior to maintain an efficient bureaucratic elite. This serves as the main message conveyed throughout the paper.
Keywords: bureaucratic capital; compensation package; corruption; ethics; revolving door; social norms; consequentialist theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D73 H10 H70 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2024-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:biu:wpaper:2024-01
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