Desinflación creíble bajo información asimétrica

Umberto Della Mea ()
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Umberto Della Mea: Banco Central del Uruguay

No 5, Documentos de trabajo from Banco Central del Uruguay

Abstract: After a period with high inflation, a new policymaker is in charge. He has private information about his own preferences for inflation, but in any case it is good for him to be believed desinflationist by the agents. Our formalization leads to the conclusion that, if this is true, the desinflationist policymaker will produce in the first period a low level of inflation, enough to be fully signalled of private information, and that he would like to play this game under full information, engaging himself in some binding agreement allowing to show his real identity in a costless way

Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1990
Note: Presentado en las Quintas Jornadas Anuales de Economía del BCU. Montevideo, 5-6 de noviembre de 1990
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