Banking Safety Nets: Information Issues

Jorge Ponce

No 2006003, Documentos de trabajo from Banco Central del Uruguay

Abstract: This paper synthesizes recent literature on the optimal design of banking safety nets. We focalize on information issues. In particular, we propose a mechanism to improve the incentives the Central Bank has to provide information to the Deposit Insurance Corporation. Such mechanism makes possible the implementation of the second-best allocation of the lender of last resort activity proposed by Repullo (2000).

Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2006-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bku:doctra:2006003

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