A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability

Jorge Ponce

No 2008006, Documentos de trabajo from Banco Central del Uruguay

Abstract: This paper uses a formal model of a bank supervisor to derive policy implications on the optimal institutional arrangements for effective banking supervision. I find that bank supervisors should have political independence, and that independence should be complemented by legal protection and accountability arrangements for bank supervisors. I provide empirical evidence supporting these results.Length: 39 pages

Keywords: Banking supervision; institutional organization; independence; legal protection; accountability; empirical evidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008, Revised 2010-10-21
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bku:doctra:2008006

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