Why do countries adopt fiscal rules?
Yener Altunbas () and
John Thornton ()
No 15006, Working Papers from Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales)
This paper examines which economic, institutional and political characteristics of countries affect the likelihood that a numeral rule will be adopted as part of a fiscal strategy to limit the level of public debt. We estimate a panel binary response model over the period 1970-2012 for 110 countries, of which 58 opted to adopt such a rule. Our results suggest that the probability such a rule will be adopted is greater if a country has a high level of public debt, a relatively inflexible exchange rate regime, has already adopted inflation targeting, has deep credit markets, and if other countries already have adopted a debt rule. There are some differences in decision factors between high-income and lower-income countries, with the level of economic development and the openness of the economy playing opposite roles in each country group, and the impact of monetary unions on debt rule adoption being much stronger in the former group. The results are robust to testing for reverse causality, including by using different econometric techniques
Keywords: Fiscal rules; Fiscal strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Why Do Countries Adopt Fiscal Rules? (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bng:wpaper:15006
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alan Thomas ().