The impact of financial development on income inequality: a quantile regression approach

Yener Altunbas, John Thornton and Yurtsev Uymaz
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Yurtsev Uymaz: Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia

No 19003, Working Papers from Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales)

Abstract: We test for a link between CEO power and risk taking in US banks. Banks are more likely to take risks if they have powerful CEOs and relatively poor balance sheets. There is little evidence that executive board size and independence have a dampening effect on the channels through which powerful CEOs influence risk-taking and some evidence that institutional investors reinforce the risk-taking preferences of powerful CEOs.

Keywords: Banks; governance; risk; CEO power; boards of directors; institutional investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 G30 G32 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

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https://www.bangor.ac.uk/business/research/documents/BBSWP-19-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The impact of financial development on income inequality: A quantile regression approach (2019)
Working Paper: The impact of financial development on income inequality: a quantile regression approach (2019)
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