Voting when the stakes are high
Jørgen Andersen () and
Jon Fiva ()
No 2010/15, Working Paper from Norges Bank
Rational choice theories of electoral participation stress that an individual's decision to vote depends on her expected net benefit from doing so. If this instrumental motive is relevant, then turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments' financial exibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on turnout.
Keywords: Voter Motivation; Elections; Turnout (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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https://www.norges-bank.no/en/news-events/news-pub ... pers/2010/WP-201015/
Journal Article: Voting when the stakes are high (2014)
Working Paper: Voting When the Stakes Are High (2013)
Working Paper: Voting when the Stakes are High (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bno:worpap:2010_15
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