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Voting when the stakes are high

Gisle Natvik, Jørgen Andersen and Jon Fiva

No 2010/15, Working Paper from Norges Bank

Abstract: Rational choice theories of electoral participation stress that an individual's decision to vote depends on her expected net benefit from doing so. If this instrumental motive is relevant, then turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments' financial exibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on turnout.

Keywords: Voter Motivation; Elections; Turnout (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2010-08-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

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Journal Article: Voting when the stakes are high (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Voting When the Stakes Are High (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Voting when the Stakes are High (2010) Downloads
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