Information sharing and information acquisition: Ownership and coverage

Artashes Karapetyan and Bogdan Stacescu

No 2011/23, Working Paper from Norges Bank

Abstract: We examine the conditions required for the existence of private credit bureaus, their ownership and coverage. Our model implies that bank consortia will most likely be preferred by banks, but that they will lead to restricted coverage. Independent credit bureaus have higher coverage, but they require good institutions. This implies an important role for public credit registers in developing countries with weak institutions. Our empirical findings largely support the implications of our model.

Keywords: Information sharing; Credit markets; Default; Adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G20 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2012-01-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cfn and nep-cta
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bno:worpap:2011_23

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