Ryan Chahrour and
Kyle Jurado ()
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Kyle Jurado: Duke University
No 1017, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics
Agents have foresight when they receive information about a random process above and beyond the information contained in its current and past history. In this paper, we propose an information-theoretic measure of the quantity of foresight in an information structure, and show how to separate informational assumptions about foresight from physical assumptions about the dynamics of the processes itself. We then develop a theory of endogenous foresight in which the type of foresight is chosen optimally by economic agents. In a prototypical dynamic model of consumption and saving, we derive a closed-form solution to the optimal foresight problem.
Keywords: expectations; rational inattention; incomplete information; noise shocks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D84 E21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-mac and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Optimal foresight (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:1017
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