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Equilibrium Player Choices in Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles

Hideo Konishi, Chen-Yu Pan and Dimitar Simeonov ()
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Dimitar Simeonov: Boston College

No 1025, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider games in which team leaders strategically choose the order of players sent to the battlefield in majoritarian team contests with multiple pairwise battles as in Fu, Lu, and Pan (2015 American Economic Review). We consider one-shot order choice games and battle-by-battle sequential player choice games. We show that as long as the number of players on each team is the same as the number of battles, the equilibrium winning probability of a team and the ex ante expected effort of each player in a multi-battle contest are independent of whether players' assignments are one-shot or battle-by-battle sequential. This equilibrium winning probability and ex ante expected total effort coincide with those where the player matching is chosen totally randomly with an equal probability lottery by the contest organizer. Finally, we show how player choices add subtleties to the equivalence result by examples.

Keywords: group contest; team contest; multi-battle contest; sports economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-spo
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