The Best at the Top? Candidate Ranking Strategies Under Closed List Proportional Representation

Benoit Crutzen, Hideo Konishi and Nicolas Sahuguet

No 1032, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: Under closed-list proportional representation, a partyís electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party list create incentives for candidates that may push parties not to rank candidates in decreasing competence order. We examine this trade-off in a game-theoretical model in which parties rank their candidate on a list, candidates choose their campaign effort, and the election is a team contest for multiple prizes. We show that the trade-off between competence and incentives depends on candidatesíobjective and the electoral environment. In particular, parties rank candidates in decreasing order of competence if candidates value enough post-electoral high offices or media coverage focuses on candidates at the top of the list.

Keywords: voting; proportional representation; tradeoffs; ranking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ore and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: The best at the top? Candidate ranking strategies under closed list proportional representation (2024)
Working Paper: The Best at the Top? Candidate Ranking Strategies under Closed List Proportional Representation (2021)
Working Paper: The Best at the Top? Candidate Ranking Strategies Under Closed List Proportional Representation (2021)
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