Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design

Marek Pycia and Utku Unver

No 1044, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: We study mechanism design and preference aggregation in environments in which the space of social alternatives is discrete and the preference domain is rich, as in standard models of social choice and so-called allocation without transfers. We show that a mechanism (or aggregation rule) selects the best outcome with respect to some resolute Arrovian social welfare function if, and only if, it is Pareto efficient and auditable. We further show that auditability implies non-bossiness and is implied by the conjunction of non-bossiness and individual strategy-proofness, and that the later conjunction is equivalent to group strategy-proofness as well as to Maskin monotonicity. As applications, we derive new characterizations in voting and allocation domains.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Arrovian preference aggregation; auditability; non-bossiness; voting; house allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design (2022)
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