Nonemptiness of the f-Core Without Comprehensiveness

Hideo Konishi and Dimitar Simeonov ()
Additional contact information
Dimitar Simeonov: Bahçeşehir University

No 1062, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: Kaneko and Wooders (1986) showed under general conditions that an atomless NTU game with finite types of players has a core allocation when coalitions have a finite number of players. In this paper, we provide a direct proof of the above result using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem when the sizes of coalitions are not only finite but also bounded above. This condition simplifies the presentation of the model and the existence proof. Most importantly, we can drop the comprehensiveness assumption, allowing for a much wider applicability of the result for matching problems, as well as for hedonic coalition formation problems. Additionally, without comprehensiveness, f-core allocations might not possess equal-treatment in payoffs for the same type. We also note that the nonemptiness of the core of NTU games by Scarf (1971) can be derived from our result as a corollary.

Keywords: f-core; comprehensiveness; atomless players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-12-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp1062.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:1062

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F Baum ().