Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Theory

Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver

No 1068, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: We survey the literature on matching theory under non-transferable utility using a classification based on property rights (i) with private ownership, (ii) with common and mixed ownership, and (iii) under priority-based entitlements.

Keywords: Matching Theory; Housing Markets; Two-sided Matching; Roommates Problem; Kidney Exchange; House Allocation; Student Placement; Reserve Systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp1068.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:1068

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F Baum ().