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Reserve Systems in Dynamic Settings: Account Design and Inherited Rights

Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver

No 1120, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: Research on reserve systems mainly considers static settings, formulating and studying choice rules for a given allocation problem. Dynamic settings are different in that the problem is not given. Over time,more positions become available, and each time the institution must build the current problem from its past. We distinguish the ledger, which stores information about earlier allocations, the account, which transforms these data into the current problem, and the choice rule, which selects an outcome for that problem. The same choice rule can implement very different policies under different accounts. If each new batch is assigned while holding earlier recipients and their categories fixed, then as batches shrink, over-and-above, the most generous reserve policy we study, can select nearly the same recipients as minimum guarantee, the most conservative one. Cumulative implementation uses a different account, which reconsiders the categories of earlier recipients, and prevents this compression. We characterize it by resource-release invariance. With arrivals or changes in priorities, the ordinary choice rule might reject an earlier recipient whose appointment has to be honored. We introduce and characterize retain, reassign, and boost (RRB) choice rules, under which every incumbent retains her appointment and can have her category changed. Combining RRB with individual-proposing deferred acceptance gives a strategy-proof mechanism under which each incumbent keeps her appointment or receives one she prefers. Applications include waiting lists in school and university admissions, public recruitment, and court-ordered corrections.

Keywords: reserve systems; dynamic; choice rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11-16
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