Wage Contracts And Specific Human Capital Investment Under Uncertainty

Chong-En Bai and Yi-jiang Wang
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Yi-jiang Wang: University of Minnesota

No 237, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: An equilibrium model of labor contracts under asymmetric information is developed. It is shown that productivity uncertainty has adverse effects on firm's wage offer to a worker, workers investment in firm specific human capital employment stability, and average productivity. Observation of and comparison between the United States and Japanese firms are made to explore the implication of the finding.

Date: 1993-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:237

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