Mafias as Enforcers

James Anderson and Oriana Bandiera

No 480, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: Historical evidence suggests that Mafias originally formed to provide enforcement of legitimate property rights when state enforcement was weak. We provide a general equilibrium model of Mafias as enforcement coalitions which protect property from predators. Both the level of predation and the type of enforcement ≥ self-enforcement, specialized competitive enforcement and Mafia enforcement ≥ are endogenous. We identify the conditions under which a coalition emerges and persists and show that Mafias are most likely to be found at intermediate stages of economic development. We also show that Mafias might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state, suggesting a difficulty in the emergence and persistence of state provision of enforcement.

Keywords: mafias; private enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 K0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2000-10-25
Note: published as "Private Enforcement and Social Efficiency"
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published, Journal of Development Economics, 2005, 77, 341-66

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:480

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