Voluntary Participation and the Provision of Public Goods in Large Finite Economies

Hideo Konishi and Ryusuke Shinohara
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Ryusuke Shinohara: Shinshu University

No 776, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a public good provision game with voluntary participation. Agents participating in the game provide a public good and pay the fees according to a mechanism (allocation rule), while nonparticipants can free-ride on the participants. We examine how the equilibrium public good provision level is affected by enlarging the population of an economy. We introduce a condition for an allocation rule, the asymptotic uniform continuity in replication (AUCR), which requires that small changes in the population must yield only small changes in the public good provision and which is satisfied by many mechanisms. We show that under AUCR, the equilibrium level of the public good converges to zero as the economy is replicated in the sense of Milleron (1972).

Keywords: public good provision; participation game; replicated economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published, Journal of Public Economic Theory 16, 173-195, 2014

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Journal Article: Voluntary Participation and Provision of Public Goods in Large Finite Economies (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:776

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