Matching with (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at United States Military Academy

Tayfun Sönmez () and Tobias Switzer
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Tayfun Sönmez: Boston College, Postal: Dept. of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA
Tobias Switzer: United States Air Force

No 782, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: Branch selection is a key decision in a cadet's military career. Cadets at USMA can increase their branch priorities at a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement. This real-life matching problem fills an important gap in market design literature. Although priorities fail a key substitutes condition, the agent-optimal stable mechanism is well-defined, and in contrast to the current USMA mechanism it is fair, stable, and strategy-proof. Adoption of this mechanism benefits cadets and the Army. This new application shows that matching with contracts model is practically relevant beyond traditional domains that satisfy the substitutes condition.

Keywords: Market Design; Matching with Contracts; Stability; Strategy-Proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013)
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