The Importance of Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts in Matching under Weakened Substitutes Conditions

Orhan Aygün () and Tayfun Sönmez
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Orhan Aygün: Boston College

No 805, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that Hatfield and Kojima (2010) inherits a critical ambiguity from its predecessor Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and clearing this ambiguity has strong implications for the paper. Of the two potential remedies, the first one results in the failure of all theorems except one in the absence of an additional irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition, whereas the second remedy eliminates the transparency of the results, reduces the scope of the model, and contradicts authors' interpretation of the nature of their contributions. Fortunately all results are restored when IRC is explicitly assumed under the first remedy.

Keywords: Matching with Contracts; Stability; Market Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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