N-S Trade with Weak Institutions
James Anderson ()
No 930, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics
States with weak institutions can lose from trade with strong states when trade is subject to predation. The happy liberal idea of trade fostering better institutions and peace can be turned on its head. The Ricardian model of trade subject to predation offered here implies imperialism without capital, contra Marxists. Weak and poor South trades with strong and rich North. Poor South labor is attracted to predation. Labor market effects of predation and enforcement amplify opposing interests in the terms of trade, potentially obviating the standard gains from trade that allows bargaining solutions to surplus division.
Keywords: Predation; enforcement; colonialism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 F16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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