Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment
Fohita Kojima () and
M. Bumin Yenmez ()
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Fohita Kojima: Stanford University
No 970, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics
Interdistrict school choice programs—where a student can be assigned to a school outside of her district—are widespread in the US, yet the market-design literature has not considered such programs. We introduce a model of interdistrict school choice and present two mechanisms that produce stable or efficient assignments. We consider three cate- gories of policy goals on assignments and identify when the mechanisms can achieve them. By introducing a novel framework of interdistrict school choice, we provide a new avenue of research in market design.
Keywords: Interdistrict school choice; student assignment; stability; efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-ure
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Working Paper: Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:970
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