Constitutional Implementation of Vertical and Horizontal Reservations in India: A Unified Mechanism for Civil Service Allocation and College Admissions

Tayfun Sönmez and M. Bumin Yenmez

No 978, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: In order to address the historic discrimination faced by various communities under the caste system, a comprehensive affirmative action system exists in India, reserving access to government jobs and to enrollment in higher educational institutions. While there is a Supreme Court-mandated mechanism to implement these reservations when the positions are homogeneous, no mechanism is provided when the positions are heterogeneous. This gap results in widespread adoption of unconstitutional mechanisms, countless lawsuits, regular judicial review, and inconsistent judgements including at the Supreme Court level. We identify the root cause of all these challenges, and propose a design to overcome them.

Keywords: Market design; matching; affirmative action; deferred acceptance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-04-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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