Social Influence in Legal Deliberations

Chaim Fershtman () and Uzi Segal

No 999, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: Juries, appellate courts, parole boards are all institutes that need to make collective decisions. What characterizes these institutes is that they are typ- ically engage in deliberations prior to decision making. Beyond information exchange, such deliberations also aim to affect the opinions, preferences and votes of other members. Using a model of social influence, we demonstrate how deliberation and voting procedures affect the voting outcome even when the same information is available to all. We then demonstrate the ability of a “designer” to manipulate the deliberation procedure in order to increase the probability that the outcome he favors will be selected.

Keywords: Committee; social influence; deliberation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04-27, Revised 2021-09-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
Note: previously circulated as "Social Influence in Committee Deliberation"
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:999

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