Social Influence in Committee Deliberation
Chaim Fershtman () and
Uzi Segal ()
No 999, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics
Committee protocols typically involve deliberations in which committee members try to influence and convince each other regarding the “right” choice. Such deliberations do not involve only information exchange, but their aim is also to affect the preferences and the votes of other members. This aspect of social influence and committee deliberation is the focus of this paper. Using a model of social influence we demonstrate how deliberation procedures affect the voting outcome and how different protocols of consultation by committees’ chairs may affect the chairs’ final decisions. We then analyze the ability of a “designer” to control the deliberation protocol and to manipulate the deliberation procedure to increase the probability that the outcome he favors will be selected.
Keywords: Committee; social influence; deliberation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
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