Wage information and applicant selection

Maria Balgova, Tsegay Tekleselassie, Lukas Hensel and Marc Witte
Additional contact information
Maria Balgova: Bank of England and IZA
Lukas Hensel: Peking University
Marc Witte: VU Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute and IZA

No 1148, Bank of England Staff Working Paper series from Bank of England

Abstract: Wage information is rare in job adverts, yet crucial for search. To study this information friction, we run a field experiment with real vacancies, randomly adding or withholding wage information. Disclosing wages does not change average application volumes. Instead, it amplifies the wage elasticity of applications: higher‑wage vacancies receive more applicants, while lower‑wage vacancies receive fewer. Average applicant quality remains unchanged, challenging standard directed search models. We rationalise the lack of skill‑based sorting with two‑sided limited information about applicants’ skills. We further show that firms’ decision not to post wages can act as insurance against unproductive matches.

Keywords: Vacancy posting; wage posting; information; field experiment; job search. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J31 J62 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69
Date: 2025-10-24
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/ ... licant-selection.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Wage Information and Applicant Selection (2025)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boe:boeewp:023270

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Bank of England Staff Working Paper series from Bank of England Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London, EC2R 8AH. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Research ().