Robustness of subgame perfect implementation

Peter Eccles and Nora Wegner ()

No 601, Bank of England working papers from Bank of England

Abstract: In this paper we consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation in situations when the preferences of players are almost perfectly known. More precisely, we consider a class of information perturbations where in each state of the world players know their own preferences with certainty and receive almost perfectly informative signals about the preferences of other players. We show that implementations using two-stage sequential move mechanisms are always robust under this class of restricted perturbations, while those using more stages are often not.

Keywords: Implementation; subgame perfect equilibrium; robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D04 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2016-05-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boe:boeewp:0601

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