Sovereign liquidity crises: analytics and implications for public policy

Michael Chui, Prasanna Gui and Andrew Haldane

Bank of England working papers from Bank of England

Abstract: This paper offers an analytical framework with which to assess some recent proposals for strengthening the international financial architecture. A model is developed of sovereign liquidity crises that reflect two sources of financial stress - weak fundamentals and self-fulfilling expectations. The nature of the underlying co-ordination game is investigated, as are the properties of the unique equilibrium. In so doing, the paper characterises the welfare costs of belief-driven crises, which are found to be potentially significant. Some recent policy proposals are also evaluated, including prudent debt and liquidity management, capital controls, greater information disclosure, and the efficacy of monetary policy tightening in the midst of crisis.

Date: 2000-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-ifn
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Sovereign liquidity crises: Analytics and implications for public policy (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boe:boeewp:121

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