Sovereign debt workouts with the IMF as delegated monitor - a common agency approach
Prasanna Gai and
Nicholas Vause ()
Bank of England working papers from Bank of England
IMF programmes are frequently criticised for lacking focus and being ineffective in helping maintain private credit lines following a debt crisis. A theoretical model is developed to explore the interlinkages between result-based conditionality and creditor collective action problems. The strategic interactions between official and private creditors are highlighted, and some of the trade-offs that underpin the design of IMF programmes are clarified. Conditions under which official creditors are able to limit the efficiency losses generated by creditor non-cooperation and debtor moral hazard are identified. The circumstances under which official lending is able to catalyse private sector finance are also analysed.
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