Bail out or work out? Theoretical considerations

Andrew Haldane, Gregor Irwin and Victoria Saporta

Bank of England working papers from Bank of England

Abstract: This paper assesses various crisis resolution proposals using a theoretical model of (liquidity and solvency) crisis. The model suggests that payments standstills and last-resort lending are equally efficient means of dealing with liquidity crises, while coordinated lending through creditor committees is second best. Debt write-downs are preferred to subsidised IMF financing when dealing with solvency crises, because of the negative moral hazard implications of the latter tool. Finally, the model suggests that international bankruptcy court proposals may be superior to existing contractual approaches in securing such write-downs.

Date: 2004-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boe:boeewp:219

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