Financial Stability Paper No 4: Reforming the IMF's Lending-into-Arrears Framework

Paul Bedford and Gregor Irwin
Additional contact information
Gregor Irwin: Bank of England, Postal: Publications Group Bank of England Threadneedle Street London EC2R 8AH

No 4, Bank of England Financial Stability Papers from Bank of England

Abstract: Episodes of sovereign default are typically associated with significant economic costs. The International Monetary Fund can help to mitigate these costs in a variety of ways, including by lending into arrears. Careful design of the broad policy framework governing the Fund’s involvement can help to ensure it has the maximum beneficial impact, without distorting the incentives of either the defaulting country or its creditors. This paper aims to identify some of the issues that are relevant to the design of such a framework, and which might helpfully be considered as part of the forthcoming review of the Fund’s lending-into-arrears policy.

Keywords: IMF; Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2008-04-14
Note: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper04.aspx
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/ ... to-arrears-framework Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boe:finsta:0004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Bank of England Financial Stability Papers from Bank of England Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London, EC2R 8AH. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Digital Media Team ().