EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Financial Stability Paper No 19: Central counterparties and their financial resources – a numerical approach

Paul Nahai-Williamson (), Tomohiro Ota, Mathieu Vital and Anne Wetherilt
Additional contact information
Tomohiro Ota: Bank of England, Postal: Publications Group Bank of England Threadneedle Street London EC2R 8AH
Mathieu Vital: Bank of England, Postal: Publications Group Bank of England Threadneedle Street London EC2R 8AH

No 19, Bank of England Financial Stability Papers from Bank of England

Abstract: New regulatory standards require central counterparties (CCPs) to have robust processes in place to mitigate their counterparty credit risk exposures. At the same time, the standards allow CCPs to tailor their risk management models. This paper considers how CCPs can optimally determine the relative mix of initial margin and default fund contributions in a stylised setting, by balancing the costs of default resources with the expected losses they protect against. Where members are of good credit quality and the probability of experiencing losses is low, the loss-mutualising properties of the default fund are favoured over the defaulter-pays properties of initial margin. Significant tail risks in the markets cleared by the CCP further favour the use of the default fund as a cost-effective insurance against potentially large losses. By contrast, when members are more likely to default or extreme losses are unlikely, the CCP has incentives to maximise the defaulter-pays collateral it takes, and the benefits of the loss-mutualising default fund are reduced. Our numerical results support the recognition that CCPs should have some discretion over how they set the optimal level and composition of their default resources, based on the specific risks of the markets and portfolios that they clear. Our results also show that changes in collateral costs and capital requirements can have a significant impact on a CCP’s optimal risk management choices.

Keywords: financial regulation; central counter parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2013-04-29
Note: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper19.aspx
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/ ... a-numerical-approach Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boe:finsta:0019

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Bank of England Financial Stability Papers from Bank of England Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London, EC2R 8AH. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Digital Media Team ().

 
Page updated 2023-01-24
Handle: RePEc:boe:finsta:0019