Market discipline and deposit insurance in Russia

Anatoly Peresetsky

No 14/2008, BOFIT Discussion Papers from Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition

Abstract: The paper presents a study of Russian banks' interest rates on household deposits during the formation period of the deposit insurance system. It is shown that market discipline weakened after deposit insurance was effectively in place. JEL codes: G21, G28, P37 Keywords: deposit insurance, market discipline, deposit interest rates

JEL-codes: G21 G28 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-02
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Published in Published in Russian in Applied Econometrics (Прикладная эконометрика), No. 3, 2008, pp. 3-14 as "Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance" (Рыночная дисциплина и страхование депозитов).

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