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Bureaucrats as successor CEOs

Tri Vi Dang and Qing He

No 13/2016, BOFIT Discussion Papers from Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition

Abstract: Chinese companies sometimes appoint a government official (bureaucrat) as CEO on the expectation of benefiting from the political connections of the new hire. Based on a sample of 2,454 CEO transitions our empirical findings are consistent with the implications of a simple contract model in oligopolistic markets. Firms that appoint a bureaucrat as CEO obtain more credit and subsidies. They have positive abnormal announcement returns, negative abnormal long-run returns and larger variance of long-run returns. Furthermore, they experience a deterioration in operating performances, increased rent-seeking behavior of the management and weakening of corporate governance. The results from the split share structure reform in 2005 corroborate the supportive findings for the preferential treatment hypothesis.

JEL-codes: G32 G34 M13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-hrm and nep-tra
Date: 2016-09-28
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