Central Bank Credibility and Monetary Policy
Kwangyong Park ()
No 2018-45, Working Papers from Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea
A numerical measure of central bank credibility, which can be incorporated into a New Keynesian model under bounded rationality, is proposed and analyzed. This measure arises mainly due to the existence of the drifts in private long-term predictions, which are different from those of the central bank. It is shown that central bank credibility matters for macroeconomic stability. As the credibility increases, macroeconomic variables vary less. This generates endogenous volatility changes. Lastly, the magnitude of response of inflation to monetary policy depends on the level of credibility. This suggests that ignoring credibility changes might leads to overestimate of the cost of disinflation.
Keywords: Monetary policy; Credibility; Learning; Bounded Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E3 E52 E58 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 74 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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http://papers.bok.or.kr/RePEc_attach/wpaper/english/wp-2018-45.pdf Working Paper, 2018 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bok:wpaper:1845
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