A Mixed Firm Objective Function: Some Instances of Bizarre Behaviour

Flavio Delbono and G. Rossini

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We analyse the objective function of a mixed firm, i.e. a firm whose controllers have different objectives (profit and value added per worker). It seems that the optimal output behaves in a bizzarre manner near critical values of a weight parameter. Output jumps up or down whenever we approach the critical value respectively from above or from below.

Date: 1991-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:114

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