The Contestability Paradigm in the Presence of Vertical Differentiation: Entering the Incumbent's Quality Niche

Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyse the interaction between vertical differentiation and contestability in the context of a repeated game with discounting. It is shown that, if consumers retaliate after hit-and-round entry and suppliers and reasonably low discount rates, contestability may not hold.

Date: 1992-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:135

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