Stackelberg equilibria and horizontal differentiation

Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper proposes a taxonomy of the Stackelberg equilibria emerging from a standard game of horizontal differentiation la Hotelling in which the strategy set of the sellers in the location stage is the real axis. Repeated leadership appears the most advantageous position. Furthermore, this endogenously yields vertical differentiation between products at equilibrium.

Date: 1993-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:161

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