Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration

Tito Cordella and Manjira Datta

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: In a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, we introduce the concept of an intertemporal Cournot equilibrium. We show that if the number of strategic agents increases without limit, the intertemporal Cournot equilibrium converges to the intertemporal Walras equilibrium only when the tune horizon for the agent is finite. If the time horizon is infinite, each strategic agent is able to exert nonnegligible market power, no matter how large their number is.

Date: 1994-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibria: An Illustration (2002)
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras equilibrium: An illustration (1995)
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibria: An Illustration (1994)
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration
Working Paper: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:193

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