Aggregate uncertainty, political instability and redistribution

Giorgio Bellettini

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper associates political instability to real shocks affecting the income of the median voter, in a two-period model where two political parties set redistribution in order to defend the interests of well-de ned constituencies. Implemented policies affect future voting outcomes and an intertemporal trade-off arises for the parties since their optimal one-period strategy does not maximize the probability of being reelected. The higher the volatility of the real shock, the more likely that parties deviate from the optimal one-period strategy by choosing a conservative strategy, which increases their chances of reelection and the expected lifetime utility of their constituencies.

Date: 1995-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:213

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