The International Coordination of Monetary Policy: A Game-Theoretic Reformulation

Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper reformulates the issue of the international coordination of monetary policy in the framework of an extended game with observable delay, where governments are required to set the timing of their respective actions before proceeding to the actual choice of their monetary policies. This allows to shrink signi cantly the set of equilibria.

Date: 1996-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/5060/1/250.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:250

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().