Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers

Luigi Alberto Franzoni

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers` reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers` services is characterized, as well as taxpayers` and auditors` optimal behavior. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.

Date: 1997-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:286

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