Vertical Differentiation With A Positional Good

Luca Lambertini () and Raimondello Orsini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We investigate the role of positional effects in a market for vertically differentiated goods. We consider the two alternative settings, a single-product monopoly and a single-product duopoly. We evaluate the performance of both regimes against social planning. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we establish that it can be socially inefficient to expand the product range.

Date: 1998-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:306

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