Endogenous Coalition Formation With Identical Agents

Davide Fiaschi and P. M. Pacini

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: Cooperative behavior often emerges at a group, rather than social level. In many instances we observe the formation of independent and sometime competing groups, teams, clubs, cooperatives (coalitions forshort) each of them persecuting the same goal (in turn provision of commodities, maximization of profits, raising of public funds, standards of behavior etc.).

Date: 1998-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:309

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