On the Social Desirability of Patents for Sequential Innovations in a Vertically Differentiated Market

Luca Lambertini () and Piero Tedeschi ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We consider a market for vertically differentiated goods where firms enter over time, after having developed innovations characterized by different quality levels. We show that the adaptation of a patent system limiting the quality range available to later entrants is socially undesirable, in that it builds a barrier to entry to the advantage of the first innovators.

Date: 2000
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the Social Desirability of Patents for Sequential Innovations in a Vertically Differentiated Market (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:376

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