Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices: Closed-Loop,Feedback and Open-Loop Solutions

Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game with price adjustments. We show that the subgame perfect equilibria are characterised by larger output and lower price levels then the open-loop solution. The individual (and industry) output at the closed-loop equilibrium is larger than its counterpart at the feedback equilibrium. Therefore, firms prefer the open-loop equilibrium to the feedback equilibrium, and the latter to the closed-loop equilibrium. The opposite applies to consumers.

Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:393

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